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This paper examines how and why a zoonotic, ‘novel’ coronavirus disease, 
Covid-19, became a pandemic of such magnitude as to bring the world to a 
standstill for several months.   Though the WHO inaccurately projected 
Covid-19 as the first pandemic by a coronavirus, it had been preceded by two 
others also caused by a similar coronavirus: SARS (severe acute respiratory 
syndrome) in 2002-03 and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) in 2014. 
In fact, following the SARS pandemic, the possibility of the emergence of 
pathogenic, virulent, ‘novel’ strains had been predicted. Therefore, the 
emergence of Covid-19 coronavirus should have come as no surprise, yet 
‘preparedness’ to deal with the emergency was seriously lacking.  
A major reason for the worldwide escalation was due to the inordinate 
delay in Covid-19 pandemic declaration by the WHO till geographical spread 
and severity had heightened considerably. This enabled the justification of 
draconian ‘suppression’ measures based on questionable science. This paper 
argues that the ‘lockdown’ strategy coming after the virus had seeded across 
countries initiating local transmission, was a political decision wrapped up in 
epidemiological parlance to give it a scientific veneer. Using the Foucauldian 
interpretation of  the public health responses to three diseases – leprosy, plague 
and smallpox –as models for three distinct forms of power techniques, this 
paper explores the biopolitical reasons for the adoption of the ‘plague’ model 
of governance which exercised ‘in full’, a transparent, unobstructed power as 
the almost universal blueprint across the world to contain Covid-19.  
Keywords 
Covid-19, coronavirus, pandemic, World Health Organization, disease 





COVID-19: A Biopolitical Odyssey 1 
1 Introduction  
This paper examines how and why a zoonotic, ‘novel’ coronavirus disease, 
Covid-19, became a pandemic of such magnitude as to bring the world to a 
standstill for several months.  The paper begins by relating the timeline of the 
development of the outbreak in the Chinese city of Wuhan in late December 
2019 up to 11 March 2020 when the WHO declared it a pandemic. During this 
period, though there was evidence of human to human transmission, with little 
restriction on air travel and tourism, the virus could spread and seed in 
different countries initiating local transmission. The paper demonstrates that 
the WHO inordinately delayed the declaration of a pandemic by changing its 
classical epidemiological definition to include severity and virulence. 
It further argues that the lockdown strategy of ‘suppression’ 
recommended by a team from the Imperial College, London, that was 
proposed within a few days of the WHO’s declaration, was based on 
mathematical modelling with limited and selective data and questionable 
assumptions. Hence, the lockdown strategy coming two and a half months 
after the announcement of the outbreak in China was of questionable value in 
containing country level epidemics across the world.  Using a Foucauldian 
framework, the paper then examines the possible biopolitical reasons for 
selection of the ‘plague model’ strategy of incarceration and argues that this 
brings in a new ‘population’, the ‘consuming-classes’, into the ambit of those to 
be ‘let die’ as a partial resolution to the ecological distress that our shared 
biosphere is facing. The conclusion is, as the world waits for the promised 
liberation through a vaccine, the reasons for the pandemic, rooted in the 
process of capital accumulation and the ensuing destruction of the global 
ecosystem that makes zoonoses a recurring imminent threat, appears to have 
been all but forgotten.  
 
1 I thank Dr. Onkar Mittal for generously sharing of his insights and work on Covid-
19. I gratefully acknowledge the members of the Editorial Board of Development and 
Change for their thoughtful feedback.  
About the author: C. Sathyamala is a public health physician and epidemiologist with a 
PhD in Development Studies from the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) 
of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. She is currently a research associate with the 
ISS. She can be reached at sathyamala@iss.nl 
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2 A timeline: from outbreak to ‘pandemic’ 
In late December 2019, the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in central China received reports of a ‘cluster’ of patients with viral 
pneumonia of unknown etiology from Wuhan city (National Health 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China, 2020). Subsequently, on 30 
December, an urgent notification was sent by the Wuhan Municipal 
Commission to the medical institutions under its jurisdiction. The next day its 
website carried an announcement of an ‘epidemic situation’, linking it to the 
‘South China Sea Food City’ (Jinyi, 2019). People in the province were urged to 
avoid enclosed places or to ‘gather’ and to wear masks while going out 
(National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China, 2020). On 1st 
January 2020, the Wuhan’s Huanan ‘wet market’ 2 was closed as the probable 
source of infection, both because of an exposure history in the current 
outbreak and because the earlier 2002 pandemic of SARS (severe acute 
respiratory syndrome), whose clinical picture resembled the new illness, 3  was 
traced to the animal market in the Guangdong province of southern China.4  
The World Health Organization (WHO) was formally informed by the 
Chinese authorities only on 3 January (National Health Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2020). 5 On 5 January, the WHO noted cautiously  
‘an exposure link to animals’ but  found ‘ no evidence of significant human-to-
human transmission’ or infection among health care workers  (emphasis 
added)  (World Health Organization, 2020a no page). The WHO did not 
recommend any specific measures for travellers and advised against imposing 
travel or trade restrictions on China.  
The first publication based on the initial cohort of 41 patients from 
Wuhan (hospitalized between 16 December 2019 to 2 January 2020) confirmed 
that the clinical presentation was similar to the previous SARS disease (Huang 
et al. 2020). The authors noted that, as of 24 January, there were already 835 
laboratory confirmed patients, with number of deaths rising ‘quickly’ (p.501). 
Data showed evidence of human to human transmission including infection 
among health-care workers (p.502). Considering the ‘exported cases’ from 
 
2 The Chinese ‘wet markets’ sell freshly slaughtered meat fish, fruits and vegetables 
whereas the ‘dry’ markets sell grain and other dry packaged goods. Some of the ‘wet 
markets’, such as that in Wuhan city sell wild animals such as snakes, beavers, badgers, 
civet cats, foxes, peacocks and porcupines, both slaughtered and live (Yu, 2020). 
3 On 30 December 2019 Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist from Wuhan Central 
Hospital, had circulated a message on a local chat app warning colleagues of a new 
‘SARS-like’ disease for which he was reprimanded by the Chinese government, asked 
to apologize for spreading ‘rumors’ and to retract his statement. Tragically, he became 
infected with the virus and succumbed on 7 February 2020 (BBC News, 2020). 
4 Later bats and palm civets had been indicted as the natural and intermediate 
reservoirs of the SARS virus (SARS-CoV). 
5 The WHO in their communique dated 5 January 2020 on the outbreak (World 
Health Organization, 2020a) glossed over the date of notification by the Chinese 
authorities. Later, in early July 2020, the WHO updated the timeline by recording that 
it was the WHO China Country Office that had informed them on 31 December 2019 
and not the Chinese authorities (AFP, 2020).    
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Wuhan to many other provinces in China and other countries, 6  the authors 
warned of a global health threat with ‘pandemic potential’ and recommended 
the need for surveillance to monitor for ‘future host adaption, viral evolution, 
infectivity, transmissibility, and pathogenicity’ (p.504). On 23 January 2020, a 
day before the Huang et al. study was published online, the Chinese authorities 
put the city of Wuhan with a population of 11 million on ‘lockdown’.7  
On cue, the WHO convened a two-day meeting on 22 and 23 January of 
an ‘Emergency Committee’ to advice the Director-General on whether to 
declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) or not 
(World Health Organization, 2020b). Data presented by the Chinese 
authorities at the meeting showed an increasing number of ‘cases’ with a 4% 
mortality rate. The epidemiological picture showed fourth-generation cases in 
Wuhan, second-generation cases outside Wuhan and clusters outside Wuhan 
provinces indicating evidence of human-to-human transmission with an 
estimated R0 (basic reproduction ratio or number) of 1.4 to 2.5.8  Yet the group 
of experts arrived at a consensus that the extent of human to 
humantransmission was ‘still not clear’. Since ‘several’ members felt it was too 
early to declare PHEIC, it was decided to ‘consider a more nuanced system 
which would allow for an intermediate alert’ (p.3). As to travel advice, the one 
issued on 10 January which did not restrict travel or trade, was to prevail 
(World Health Organization, 2020c), even though, ‘exported cases’ in other 
countries had already been recorded and the WHO ‘situation report’ (SR) 9 
published for that day (23 January) warned that more cases were likely to be 
‘exported’ and further transmission ‘may’ occur (World Health Organization, 
2020d:1). The WHO assigned the risk of ‘this event’ to be ‘very high in China, 
high at the regional level and high at the global level’ (World Health 
Organization, 2020d:2) without providing the criteria for grading risks as low,  
  
 
6 By 20 January 2020, Japan reported one, Thailand two, Republic of Korea one 
patient with confirmed diagnosis (Xinhua Net, 2020) and on 21 January one person 
was diagnosed in the USA (Holshue et al. 2020). They all had travel history to China.  
7 The Chinese New Year celebrations and the spring festival was to begin from 24 
January and end on the 30 January. To contain the outbreak, the holidays were 
extended until 2 February (The State Council, 2020).  
8 ‘Generations of cases’ indicates transmission rates. R0 known as basic reproduction 
ratio, refers to the contagiousness or transmissibility potential of an infectious or 
parasitic agent. It is defined as the expected number of cases that would be generated 
from one case in a population that has no immunity. R0 =1 means one infected person 
will infect one other person. Although R0 is presented in a simplistic manner as, for 
instance, ‘an outbreak is expected to continue if R0 has a value >1 and to end if R0 is 
<1’, it is a complex metric arrived through mathematical modelling based on varied 
assumptions  (Delamater et al.  2019:1). ‘R0 is an estimate of contagiousness that is a 
function of both human behaviour and biological characteristics of pathogens. R0 is 
not a measure of the severity of an infectious disease or the rapidity of a pathogen’s 
spread through a population’ (Delamater et al. 2019 :3). 
9 The WHO began publishing daily SRs from 21 January 2020 onwards with the last 
one (No. 209) published on 16 August 2020. Since then it publishes weekly reports.  
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moderate, high, or very high.10 Importantly, the report carried a footnote 
(number 3) which stated that SRs of 23, 24, and 25 January,  ‘as originally 
published’, had ‘incorrectly summarized the risk for global level to be 
moderate’ and that it had now been corrected to ‘high’.11  No information was 
provided as to why the previous assessment was considered incorrect or when 
the ‘error’ was noticed and corrected. It is difficult to accept this change in 
grading of risks post facto as a correction of an innocuous ‘error’. Grading is 
meant to convey levels of severity and has implications for planning preventive 
strategies by member countries and it is not clear what the implications were of 
a correction made days (weeks?) later. 
Table 1 shows the weekly escalation and spread of infection from 23 
January, the day of the WHO expert committee meeting as per data from 
WHO daily SRs. As can be seen, within a week (i.e. by 30 January), the number 
of countries (other than China) with confirmed cases had increased from 4 to 
18. On this day the outbreak of COVID-19 was declared a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern but travel advisory still did not restrict  
TABLE 1 
Countries, territories or areas with reported confirmed cases of 2019-nCoV  





















23.01.2020 571 17 v. high  4 7 0 high Corrected* 
from moderate 
 to high 
30.01.2020 7736 170 v. high 18 82 0 high high 
06.02.2020 28,060 564 v. high 24 216 1 high high 
13.02.2020 46,550 1368 v. high 24 447 1 High high 
20.02.2020 74,675 2121 v. high 26 1073 8 high high 
27.02.2020 78,630 2747 v. high 46 3664 57 high high 
28.02.2020 78,961 2791 v. high 51 4691 67 v. high** v. high** 
05.03.2020 80,565 3015 v. high 85 14,759 266 v. high v. high 
11.03.2020*** 80,955 3162 v. high 113 37,364 1130 v. high v. high 
*    in the SRs of 23, 24, and 25 January, initially the WHO had assigned a ‘moderate’ risk at the global 
level and later the ‘error’ was corrected, and the risk upgraded to ‘high’ without providing the rationale 
or the dates when these changes were made. 
**  ‘local transmission’ reported for the first time in several countries.  
*** date when the WHO declared it a pandemic. 
 
tourism (WHO and UNWTO, 2020).  By the first week of February, the 
number of countries affected as well as the number of confirmed cases had 
 
10 Although the WHO’s SR of the previous day (22 January) mentioned that sixteen 
health workers had been infected (World Health Organization, 2020e), the report 
refrained from concluding that it indicated human to human transmission.   
11 These ‘original’ SRs published on the 23, 24, 25 January are no longer available in 
the public domain and only the ‘corrected’ versions are available.   
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increased further, and the first death was recorded outside of China.  The 
event could now be described as a pandemic as per textbook definitions (more 
on this later). 
Though in the next two weeks, the global situation appeared to stabilize, 
from the fourth week of February, the number of confirmed cases in countries 
other than China had almost quadrupled and the number of countries affected 
had doubled. Alarm bells began to ring and epidemiologists queried, , ‘[i]s the 
Covid-19 outbreak now a pandemic, whether or not the World Health 
Organization calls it that yet?’ (Osterholm and Olshaker, 2020).  
On 28 February, the WHO upgraded the risk status for ‘Regional level’ 
and ‘Global level’ to ‘very high’ (World Health organization, 2020f) again, 
without providing a rationale for the change in the grade. On that day, the 
number of cases in China was the lowest reported for that month but outside 
China, there were 4691 cases spread over 51 countries, with a total of 67 
deaths. This was also the day that, for the first time, ‘local transmission’ was 
reported from several countries. By 5 March, the number of countries 
reporting increased to 85 with a total of 266 deaths (World Health 
organization, 2020g) but the WHO still refrained from declaring it a pandemic. 
It was only a week later, when the number of countries reporting the disease 
had increased to 113 and deaths had risen four-folds to 1130 (World Health 




3 Pandemic: a descriptive term gains virulence  
In the media briefing of 11 March 2020, the Director-General of the WHO 
provided the rationale for declaring a pandemic: 
…we [the WHO] are deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and 
severity, and by the alarming levels of inaction. We have therefore made the 
assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.  (WHO 
Director-General, 2020a: no page) 
From this statement, it appeared, that for the WHO, to ‘characterize’ an 
event as a pandemic, there needed to be an ‘alarming level’ of spread, severity, 
and inaction. However, a dictionary of epidemiology defines pandemics 
differently as, ‘ “an epidemic occurring over a very wide area, crossing 
international boundaries, and usually affecting a large number of people” ’ 
(Porta 2014 as quoted in Madhav et al. 2018 :315 ).12 The definition of a  
pandemic does not include the virulence of the agent, i.e., morbidity (illness) 
and mortality (death) rates. Had the WHO applied this classical 
epidemiological definition, the current ‘event’ would have been ‘characterized’ 
a pandemic much earlier, i.e, by the 30 January, or, at the very least, by the end 
of February, two weeks prior to the WHO’s official declaration when it 
upgraded the ‘risk’ from high to very high at the global level (see Table 1).   
The WHO’s first  attempt to change the classical definition of a pandemic 
by linking ‘severity’ with geographical spread, was in 2009 in the wake of the 
H1N1 influenza pandemic.13 In 1999 the WHO had developed ‘pandemic 
phases’ as ‘tools’ for planning emergency preparedness and action which were 
later revised in 2005. Primarily developed for influenza epidemics, it had six 
phases, of which phase 5 and phase 6 are of relevance to the discussion here. 
Phase 5 was when ‘the virus [had] caused sustained community level outbreaks 
in two or more countries in one WHO region’  and phase 6 was when  ‘[i]n 
addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5, the same virus [had] caused 
sustained community level outbreaks in at least one other country in another 
WHO region’ (World Health Organization, 2010/2009:8). In the H1N1 
pandemic, the severity of the infection was very low but, because of the 
geographical spread, the pandemic status had been upgraded from Phase 5 to 
6; at that time 42 countries were officially reporting H1N1 cases, and globally 
there were 11,168 laboratory confirmed cases and 86 deaths (World Health 
Organization, 2009). However, the member countries objected to the shift 
from Phase 5 to Phase 6 on the basis of geographical spread because they felt  
 
12 An epidemic is defined as ‘ “the occurrence in a community or region of cases of an 
illness . . . clearly in excess of normal expectancy” ’(Porta 2014 as quoted in Madhav et 
al. 2018: 315) 
13 The H1N1 influenza pandemic originated in the US in January 2009 and spread 
across the US and the world and ended in August 2010. It was popularly known as 




it conveyed a message that ‘“You should be very afraid”’ (p. 5). As a medical-
scientific body, the WHO could have then clarified, that the definition of 
pandemic and phasing of the severity/lethality of a specific agent are two 
different issues.  But instead, to accommodate the sentiment of their member 
countries, on 22 May 2009, the WHO informed the press that it was 
considering changing the criteria of Phase 6 to include ‘a really substantial 
increase in risk of harm to people’ (p. 6) by conflating geographical spread and 
severity into one definition.  
However, even at that time, the WHO’s proposal to change the definition 
of pandemic was questioned by some. For instance, Vincent Racaniello, a 
virologist wrote in his blog: 
Apparently members of the United Nations don’t like the fact that WHO has 
been using ‘pandemic’ to describe the global spread of the new H1N1 influenza 
strains … Apparently using the p-word gets everyone frightened as pandemic 
preparedness plans shift into gear… WHO redefining pandemic is 
absurd…WHO should leave textbook writing to others. To paraphrase Andre 
Lwoff, a pandemic is a pandemic. The word implies nothing about virulence – 
and has little to do with politics. (Racaniello, 2009).  
Though the WHO had been formulating guidelines for pandemic 
preparedness for more than two decades, it had never formally defined the 
term pandemic (Doshi 2011).14 Referring to the WHO’s press briefing of May 
2009, Morens et al. (2009) discussed at length the origin and its use by tracing 
the term’s historic evolution. They noted that, though there was a general 
consensus in public health for the classical definition, the confusion had risen 
in the process of translating ‘complex scientific ideas into publicly 
comprehensible language’ (Morens et al. 2009: 1010). They concluded that 
defining a pandemic as a large epidemic would make better sense but that the 
term should be reserved for infectious diseases only and not be extended to 
non-communicable diseases.  
Abraham (2010:1307) remarks that, the distrust generated by the word 
pandemic with reference to the H1N1 influenza spread was due to the use of 
advocacy tools deployed to provoke governments and public to act which 
ended up fueling fear. This had arguably created a public image of pandemics 
being catastrophic events to be dealt at war footing. Doshi (2011), however, 
concluded that the pandemic label of ‘necessity’ must carry a notion of 
severity. Disagreeing with Doshi, Kelly (2011:540) restated that the classical 
definition includes nothing about population immunity, virology or disease 
severity and that including severity in the  pandemic definition is a deliberate 
attempt by the WHO to ‘garner political attention and financial support for 
pandemic preparedness’. Further, Kelly averred, that in the case of H1N1 
influenza, delaying the declaration of the pandemic several weeks after the 
criteria had already been met, was to link it to the announcement of the 
 
14 This holds true for other authoritative scientific publications as well. For instance, 
the Institute of Medicine in its 2007 report of a workshop on Ethical and Legal 
Considerations in Mitigating Pandemic Disease, does not contain a definition of pandemic. 
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production of pandemic-specific vaccine because, had the classical pandemic 
definition been used, the vaccine may have been found to be unnecessary.  
Despite the 2009 announcement to change definitions, the WHO retained 
the old rules in their updated 2009 publication.  However, it seems that the 
intention to change the definition had remained unchanged because the WHO 
delayed the declaration of the Covid-19 as a pandemic by including ‘alarming’ 
severity as a ‘characteristic’ of a pandemic. Further, as noted earlier, not 
providing the criteria for grading the severity of risk, added to the arbitrariness 
and lack of transparency of the scientific body.  Strangely, the WHO’s new 
definition of ‘pandemic’ has largely gone unremarked even by epidemiologists. 
In fact, a recent publication (Dawood et al. 2020) uncritically used 11 March 
2020 as a cutoff point to divide timeline of the Covid-19 spread into ‘pre-
pandemic’ and ‘post-pandemic’ periods.  
The term pandemic gained further virulence in the media and, through it, 
in the public mind, when the Director-General stated in the same press 
conference of 11 March 2020 declaration:  
Pandemic is not a word to use lightly or carelessly. It is a word that, if misused, 
can cause unreasonable fear, or unjustified acceptance that the fight is over, 
leading to unnecessary suffering and death. Describing the situation as a 
pandemic does not change WHO’s assessment of the threat posed by this virus. 
It doesn’t change what WHO is doing, and it doesn’t change what countries 
should do. (WHO Director-General, 2020a: no page). 
This statement, apart from mystifying –why should the declaration lead to 
‘unjustified acceptance that the fight is over’ when it was meant to galvanize 
action, generated worldwide panic, setting into motion reactions 
disproportionate to the threat that the ‘pandemic’ posed at that time. Green 
(2020:1035) speculated that, ‘[i]f the use of the term pandemic is delayed too 
long, [it]… could convey a message to the public that the authorities have lost 
control, generating irrational panic reactions’. It is tempting to conclude, that 
perhaps was the precise intention for delaying the declaration – to create a 
panic reaction. The irony is that the WHO’s declaration of a ‘Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern’ on 30 January 2020, which should have 
galvanized action, did not provoke much reaction from its member states.15   
But most extraordinary was the Director-General’s statement in that press 
conference: ‘We have never before seen a pandemic sparked by a coronavirus. 
This is the first pandemic caused by a coronavirus’ (WHO Director-General, 
2020a: no page).  With this, the WHO inexplicably denied a historical and an 
epidemiological fact of two pandemics in the 21st century, the SARS pandemic 
of 2002-03 and the MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) pandemic of 
2014, both due to a coronavirus;  at its height, SARS (caused by SARS-CoV), 
 
15 There were some notable exceptions. For instance, as early as 26 January 2020, the 
Kerala state in India set into motion a system of surveillance by issuing guidelines 
(Department of Health and Family Welfare, 2020). 
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was reported from 26 countries  (World Health Organization no date-a)16 and 
MERS (caused by MERS-CoV) was reported from 27 countries (World Health 
Organization, no date- b). Between SARS and MERS, the current Covid-19 
epidemic is more closely related to SARS both in terms of the probable origin 
and clinical picture. However, right from the beginning of the current epidemic 
when the new coronavirus disease had to be named, the WHO decided to not 
link it with SARS in the public mind.  
 
16 Although the WHO refers to SARS global spread as an ‘epidemic’ (World Health 
Organization, no date-a), scientific literature views it, rightly, as a pandemic. See, for 




4 The ‘Novel’ coronavirus: what’s in a name?   
The etiologic agent of the current pandemic was identified by the Chinese 
CDC (Center for Disease Control and Prevention) on 7 January, 2020, 
(National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China 2020) as a 
‘novel betacoronavirus, (in the same family as SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV)’ 
(emphasis added) (World Health Organization, 2020i).17 Here the term ‘novel’ 
is used in a relative sense; a novel virus is novel only till a new (novel) strain is 
identified.  In the interim period between identification and the christening 
with an appropriate name, the new  viral agent was named ‘2019 novel 
coronavirus’, to indicate that it belonged to the family of corona, was different 
from the previously identified ones and therefore new (novel) and had been 
‘discovered’ as a disease agent in 2019. 18 On 11 February, 2020, it was named 
‘severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)’ as it is 
genetically closely related to the SARS virus (Coronaviridae Study Group of 
the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, 2020). The same day, 
the WHO, entrusted with naming of diseases, named it Covid-19 (World 
Health Organization no date- c) which is an acronym of corona virus disease 
of 2019. According to the WHO,  though it was closely linked to SARS, the 
decision to not  name the disease as SARS-2, was because of the concern that 
‘[f]rom a risk communication perspective, using the name of SARS can have 
unintended consequences in terms of creating unnecessary fear for some 
populations, especially in Asia which was worst affected by the SARS outbreak 
in 2003’ (World Health Organization, no date-c, no page). Even if this 
sentiment were to be taken in good faith, the disconnect created between the 
name of the virus and that of the disease, a practice at variance while naming 
SARS, allowed for the possibility of projecting Covid-19 as a completely new 
disease. This  delinking allowed for the obfuscation of the familial relationship 
of the two coronaviral diseases and of the failure to take cognizance of 
epidemiological intelligence that had predicted a possibility of future novel 
 
17 It is called coronavirus because of the crown-like spikes on their surface (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, no date).  
18 In 2015, the WHO, in close collaboration with the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and in consultation 
with the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)  developed a new criteria for 
naming new human infectious diseases (World Health Organization, 2015). This was 
in order to ‘minimize unnecessary negative impact of disease names on trade, travel, 
tourism or animal welfare, and avoid causing offence to any cultural, social, national, 
regional, professional or ethnic group’ (World Health Organization, 2015: 1) as in the 
past, names such as ‘swine-flu’, ‘Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome’ (MERS) had 
created a negative impact on the specific industry and community after which they 
had been named (Fakuda et al. 2015). However, notwithstanding the care that was 
taken to prevent stigmatization, Donald Trump had little compunction calling Covid-
19 virus a ‘Chinese virus’ (Chiu, 2020). Incidentally, the first known case of the 
infamous ‘Spanish flu’ (1918) was reported not from Spain but from the military base 
at Kansas, USA. For an interesting account on why it was called ‘Spanish’ flu see 
Andrews (2020/2016).  
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coronavirus disease post-SARS pandemic (see El Zowalaty and Järhult, 2020; 
Hu et al. 2017; Wang et al.2006; Zhou et al. 2018).  
SARS-CoV-2 (the Covid-19 virus) is the seventh coronavirus known to 
infect humans, and, of the seven, only three (SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and 
SARS-CoV-2) have caused serious outbreaks (Andersen et al. 2020). All the 
three are zoonoses19 that are transmitted from animals20 but while in the 
former two, the link to animal reservoir has been confirmed, in SARS-CoV-2, 
the origin is still mired in controversy.21  Though the clinical picture is not very 
different,  the three differ in terms of fatality rates and the basic reproduction 
number R0. Among the three, MERS had the highest case fatality rate (CFR)22 
at 34.4% followed by SARS which had a CFR of 9.5% (Petrosillo et al. 2020) 
and the R0 for MERS was less than 1 and that for SARS between 1.7-1.9. 
Hence, in MERS and SARS pandemics, both because the CFR was very high, 
and because of the low R0, it was possible to contain them within a short time. 
In contrast, community spread with Covid-19 virus takes place more easily and 
silently because of asymptomatic transmission (Gandhi et al. 2020) and hence, 
though less lethal in many populations, is more difficult to contain.23   
 
19 A zoonotic disease is defined as, ‘any disease or infection that is naturally 
transmissible from vertebrate or invertebrate animals to humans and vice-versa’ 
(Bueno-Mari et al. 2015:7).  
20 In SARS-CoV, bats (specifically horseshoe bats) were identified as a natural 
reservoir with probably palm civets as intermediate hosts (Wang et al. 2006). In 
MERS-CoV, the dromedary camels were identified as reservoir host with the 
possibility of bats as ‘original’ reservoir (Killerby et al. 2020). For an extensive 
discussion on coronavirus and animal reservoirs see Corman et al. (2018). 
21 The competing theory to the wildlife origins (from bats passed through an 
intermediate animal, probably Malayan pangolin), is that the virus ‘escaped’ from the 
high secure Wuhan Institute of Virology that holds coronaviruses related to the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus (Cyranoski, 2020). But as Cyranoski notes, it could well take many 
years before the controversy can be resolved, if at all. In the earlier SARS outbreak of 
2002, the virus link to bats could be confirmed only after 13 years. Moreover, as 
Cyranoski notes, given the geopolitical sensitivity, it could be near impossible for an 
independent investigation of the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Luc Montagnier, the 
French virologist and Nobel Laureate supported the ‘man-made’ theory of the virus, a 
claim discredited by other scientists (Bast, 2020). Andersen et al. (2020:450, 452) argue 
that it is ‘improbable’ that SARS-CoV-2 emerged through laboratory manipulation of 
a related SARS-CoV-like coronavirus, but do not rule out an ‘inadvertent laboratory 
release of SARS-CoV-2’. China came up with its own narrative. While in the initial 
period the ‘wet market’ link was accepted, on 12 March 2020, after the WHO 
declaration of pandemic, Chinese authorities claimed that the virus had been 
introduced into China by the US Army (Fook, 2020).   
22 CFR is the proportion of people dying of those defined as cases and is expressed as 
a percentage. 
23 Petrosillo et al. (2020) point out that that the high virulence of MERS required 
hospitalization more frequently and therefore reduced the risk of community spread 
although it increased nosocomial (hospital acquired) infections. Covid-19 virus has 
also increased nosocomial infection rates.  
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5 Doing it with numbers  
Data are not neutral and what is collected and how it is reported affect how a 
health problem is perceived and acted upon and moreover, ‘usually what is 
missing is of key significance’ (Krieger, 1992:421). From the daily SRs of the 
WHO, a key metric that is missing is CFR. This term appears for the first time 
in the report dated 19 February 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020j) and 
that is the only time it finds a mention in the WHO SRs. However, in the first 
week of August, the WHO released a ‘Scientific Brief’ (from now on ‘Brief’) 
entitled Estimating mortality from Covid-19 (World Health Organization, 2020k). 
The ‘Brief’ was not targeted at epidemiologists and public health experts as it 
was too basic to improve their knowledge. It was 
 … intended to help countries estimate CFR and, if possible, IFR [infection 
fatality rate], as appropriately and accurately as possible, while accounting for 
possible biases in their estimation…In the COVID-19 pandemic, we have seen 
broad variations in naïve estimations of CFR that may be misleading. (emphasis 
added) (World Health Organization, 2020k:2-3)  
The Covid-19 event is not unique as infectious diseases behave and the 
errors, complexities and biases in estimation described in the ‘Brief’ are 
unexceptional; every infectious disease investigation, whether by a ‘novel’ agent 
or an ‘old’ (known) one, will need to take into consideration these factors while 
estimating CFRs.24 The intriguing question is, why did the WHO, with the 
resources and expertise within its command, not provide estimates of CFR if it 
had reservations about those that were being made available in the public 
domain by other agencies?25 Even with imprecise data, the CFR, however 
‘crude’ and ‘naïve’,  would have provided a far better measure for assessing 
severity and for comparative purposes than absolute numbers of ‘cases’; all that 
was needed was to include the CFR as an additional column in the table of 
figures calculated from the absolute numbers of cases and deaths presented 
there.26  
 
24 Already, early in the pandemic, in March 2020, the Lancet Infectious  Diseases  Journal  
published in its ‘correspondence’ section a series of letters on the nuances of CFR 
estimation in general and Covid-19, in particular (Baud and Nielsen-Saines et al.,  
2020; Baud and Qi et al., 2020; Kim and Goel, 2020; Lipsitch, 2020; Rajgor et al., 
2020;  Spychalski et al., 2020). 
25 There seems to be some exceptions. In late February the report of the WHO-China 
Joint Mission on Covid-19, estimated a crude CFR of 3.8%. In this report, the WHO 
used the acronym CFR for what they termed Crude fatality Ratio (World Health 
organization, 2020l:12). Again, in the media briefing of 3 March 2020, the WHO’s 
Director-General mentioned that ‘[g]lobally, 3.4% of reported Covid-19 have died’ 
(WHO Director-General, 2020b). 
26 ‘Excess mortality’ is another critical measure to assess severity of the pandemic and 
Giattino et al. (undated) have stated that no international database is being published 
by international organizations that would enable estimating excess mortality due to 
Covid-19. Hospitalization rates, especially of severe symptomatic people is yet 
another.     
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Unfortunately, and perhaps not inexplicably, the WHO had decided to keep it 
simple. The data provided through the WHO’s daily SRs dealt only in absolute 
numbers. And the absolute numbers were scary as they exponentially increased 
day by day creating a spectre of a global overwhelm.   
Without providing CFRs in its SRs, the WHO’s ‘Brief’, coming more than 
six months after the global spread of Covid-19, appears to have been provoked 
by the availability in the public domain data on CFRs. Though the 
methodology and database may have varied, a common thread that could be 
discerned in the different platforms was the vastly varying epidemiological 
picture of Covid-19,  across countries and regions.27 But what was perhaps 
discomfiting to the WHO was the ‘widely variable estimates of CRF by country 
– from less than 0.1% to over 25%’ (World Health Organization, 2020k:1).28 
Moreover, in the popular media, the wide varying trends across countries was  
beginning to create  a counter-discourse to the one spear-headed by the WHO 
which depicted Covid-19 as a highly virulent disease. 29 It was perhaps to 
prevent the emergence  of  a feared ‘complacency’, and to provide a handle to 
governments (its audience),  the WHO gave primacy to IFR  and emphasized 
that ‘a complete picture of the number of infections of, and deaths caused by, the 
disease must be known’ for its estimation (emphasis added) (World Health 
Organization, 2020k:1), well knowing,  of the difficulty in ascertaining a 
‘complete’ picture in the middle of an epidemic/pandemic and the need for 
enormous resources to carry out serological tests at the community level. In 
any case, a CFR is generally considered adequate to understand patterns and 
plan strategies during an outbreak.  
While CFR as an indicator of virulence did not get the attention it 
deserved, what occupied mediaspace were mathematical modellings, 
projections and the rising number of ‘cases’. Five days after the WHO declared 
a ‘pandemic’, the Imperial College Covid-19 Response Team, London, (from now on 
the ‘Imperial Team’) published their  assessment of the impact of ‘non-
pharmaceutical interventions’ on mortality and health care demands for the 
UK and the USA (Ferguson et al. 2020).30 Undeterred  by the less than precise 
data that were available for their model at that point of time, which the WHO 
 
27 Worldometer is one such public platform operated ‘by a small and independent 
digital media company based in the United States’ 
(https://www.worldometers.info/about/). It has been providing data since the 
beginning of the pandemic. Though the countries are listed on the basis of the 
‘number of cases’ which is a biased presentation of the situation, the website is useful 
to understand the global situation. ‘Our World in Data’ is another a collaborative 
effort between researchers at the University of Oxford, and a non-profit organization 
Global Change Data Lab (https://ourworldindata.org/about). 
28 The WHO provides no citation for this figure. I have not come across 25% CFR 
with Covid-19 in literature search.  
29 See for instance Oltermann (2020) and The Print Team (2020). 
30 The Imperial College Covid-19 Response Team comprised the WHO Collaborating 
Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease 
Analysis, Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, and the 
Imperial College of London (Ferguson et al., 2020). 
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had said was too crude  even to assess CFRs, the report began  with an 
unwarranted premise: 
The last time the world responded to a global emerging disease epidemic of the 
scale of the current COVID-19 pandemic with no access to vaccines was the 
1918-19 H1N1 influenza pandemic. In that pandemic, some communities, 
notably in the United States (US), responded with a variety of non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) - measures intended to reduce transmission 
by reducing contact rates in the general population. (Ferguson et al., 2020:3) 
First, it was disingenuous to compare the Covid-19 situation which, at the 
time of modeling, had recorded globally only 6470 deaths (Ferguson et al.  
2020), to the 1918-19 influenza pandemic which had killed at least 50 million 
worldwide (CDC no date). Aside from this, comparing the two was untenable 
because the unique feature of the 1918-19 pandemic was that mortality was 
high in healthy people, particularly in the 20-40 year age group (CDC no date), 
whereas in the Covid-19 situation the mortality is concentrated in the relatively 
immuno-compromised older age groups with or without co-morbid 
conditions.  Secondly, it needed further ingenuity to flag the issue of a vaccine 
at this early stage of the Covid-19 pandemic when there was little evidence to 
show how it would evolve across the world and whether there would be a need 
for a vaccine at all.  The Imperial team then announced to the world that their 
simulation model had predicted approximately 510,000 deaths for the UK and 
2.2. million deaths for the US, in an ‘unmitigated epidemic’, ‘not accounting for 
the potential negative effects of health systems being overwhelmed on 
mortality’ (Ferguson et al. 2020:7).31 The next day the New York Times remarked 
that the impact of the study , ‘ wasn’t so much the numbers themselves, 
frightening though they were, as who reported them: Imperial College London’ 
(Landler and Castle, 2020). Such reverence to the epistemic authority of the 
‘Imperial team’ meant that  a non-peer reviewed report, published on the 
website of the Imperial College London (member of the modeling team), was 
accepted even by the scientific community without much demur.32  The 
Imperial Team’s projection of the probable mortality, though calculated only 
for the UK and US, was embraced by other countries as a likely scenario in 
 
31 In less than two weeks, Ferguson, the lead epidemiologist of the Imperial team 
Study revised the estimate for UK from 510,000 deaths to less than 20,000 deaths, 
which he later denied (Outlook 2020). In April 2020, Ferguson revised the estimate to 
7,000 to 20,000 deaths allegedly because of the measure taken by the UK government 
(Reuters Staff 2020). 
32 For instance, Devi Sridhar, director of the Global Health Governance program at 
Edinburgh University was quoted as saying ‘ “[a] lot of it is not what they say, but who 
says it …Neil Ferguson has a huge amount of influence” ’ (Landler and Castle, 2020). 
There were some counters by other scholars but mostly in ‘grey’ literature (see for 
instance, Dayaratna, 2020; Sagar, 2020; Shen et al. 2020). Due to increasing criticism 
on the reproducibility of the Imperial Team model, Nature published in their News 
column that the model had been successfully ‘code tested’ which, though, ‘isn’t a 
review of the scientific accuracy of the simulation, … dispels some misapprehensions 
about the code, and shows that others can repeat the original findings’ (Chawla, 2020).  
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theirs too. The report thus became the foundation for the dominant global 
strategy for dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic/epidemic.33  
The Imperial Team’s report, modeled on an earlier ‘microsimulation’ with 
the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2005 by its lead author Neil Ferguson, was based 
on several questionable assumptions. The data that went into the construction 
of the model were from the Chinese outbreak and aside from the fact that it 
was at a very early stage of a still evolving outbreak, the data was applied 
uncritically to other populations (UK and USA) without reference to 
contextual factors. Based on the Wuhan data, the model assumed a R0 of 2.4 
with values between 2.0 and 2.6.34  It is not clear why the model was not 
developed as well for a lower R0 in the range, as an earlier report from Wuhan 
had estimated R0 to be from 1.4 to 2.5 (World Health Organization, 2020b). 
Further, R0 itself is a product of mathematical modeling and not a fixed entity 
for a pathogen and this variability was not incorporated into the model. In this 
model, as also in many subsequent models by others, there was one unstated 
assumption:  that, as a ‘novel’ pathogen, all populations were equally 
immunologically naïve and were therefore universally vulnerable.  However, as 
later research showed, the R0 varied across populations; for instance, the R0 for 
India was estimated at a much lower level of 1.37 with a tight 95% Confidence 
Interval (1.375, 1.384) (Marimuthu et al., 2020).35 Importantly, the Imperial 
Team failed to include in their model, testing and contact tracing, which had 
been mandated by the WHO as vital elements in the control strategy (Adam, 
2020; Shen et al.2020).36 
  
 
33 Notable exceptions to complete lockdown were Japan, Sweden, South Korea; 
Netherlands took a softer option.  
34 Further, in the Imperial college model, the age-stratified proportion of patients 
requiring hospitalization and the IFR, both critical variables, were also taken from ‘a 
subset of cases from China’ presented by Verity et al. (2020a) in a non-peer reviewed 
publication. Verity et al. (2020a) study was later published in a peer reviewed journal 
(2020b). One citation (Yang et al., 2020a) published on 11 February 2020, which 
formed the basis for an important Table No.3 in Verity et al. (2020a; 2020b) had been 
retracted by the authors on 21 February 2020 (seeYang et al., 2020b).. When the 
retraction was brought to the notice to the co-corresponding author of Verity et al. by 
retractionwatch.com, the author Azra Ghani, admitted to being unaware of the 
retraction and stated that they would update their peer reviewed publication. It has 
not been done yet. Both Yang et al. (2020a; 2020b) have been given the same doi and 
therefore the paper published on 11 February 2020 (Yang et al. 2020a) is not available 
in the public domain (the author had downloaded a copy before it was taken off the 
net).  
35 In the context of India, one hotly debated issue is whether the BCG vaccination, a 
mandatory vaccine give at birth in India, has a protective effect against Covid-19 
(Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative, 2020; IANS 2020). 
36 The WHO did not see it fit to release a ‘Scientific Brief’ on the pros and cons of 




6 How to incubate a pandemic: travel abroad and seed 
along 
On 23 March 2020, a week after the Imperial study was published, another 
modeling study (Lourenço et al. 2020), later known as the ‘Oxford study’, also 
not peer-reviewed, was published.37 The authors presented some startling 
conclusions. Their results suggested that ‘the ongoing epidemics in the UK and 
Italy started at least a month before the first reported death and [had] already 
led to the accumulation of significant levels of herd immunity in both 
countries’ (Lourenço et al. 2020:1).  
The spread of a novel pathogenic infectious agent eliciting protective immunity is 
typically characterised by three distinct phases: (I) an initial phase of slow 
accumulation of new infections (often undetectable), (II) a second phase of rapid 
growth in cases of infection, disease and death, and (III) an eventual slow down 
of transmission due to the depletion of susceptible individuals, typically leading 
to the termination of the (first) epidemic wave. Before the implementation of 
control measures (e.g. social distancing, travel bans, etc) and under the 
assumption that infection elicits protective immunity, epidemiological theory 
indicates that the ongoing epidemic of SARS-CoV-2 will conform to this pattern. 
(Lourenço et al. 2020:1) 
Given this, the authors estimated that by 19 March, ‘approximately 36% 
(R 0 =2.25) and 40% (R 0 =2.75) of the [UK] population would have already 
been exposed to SARS-CoV-2’ and that approximately 68% in UK would have 
been ‘infected’ by then (Lourenço et al. 2020:3). Additionally, the two critical 
assumptions in the  Oxford study that were absent from the Imperial study 
were: one, that substantial transmission would have taken place before the first 
death due to Covid-19 was recorded and, two, that only a fraction of the 
population (0.1% to 1%) was at risk of serious disease (mostly comprising the 
older age groups and those with co-morbid conditions). The Oxford team was 
also transparent about the robustness of their data by providing a 95% 
confidence interval which the Imperial Team had not.  
Infectious disease epidemiology tells us that the Oxford study scenario 
was better grounded in science because, there was more than a possibility that 
by the time the first ‘case’ was noticed (hospitalized) and notified, community 
transmission would have already begun. However, the community transmission 
would have remained silent/un-noticed and un-quantified because of a 
likelihood of them being asymptomatic ‘cases’ (infected persons showing no 
symptoms of the disease), or with mild ‘flu-like’ symptoms requiring out-
patient care, if at all.38 In Wuhan city too, it was estimated that the virus was 
probably in circulation from August 2019, five months before the hospitalized 
cases were noticed as a ‘cluster’ (Nsoesie et al. 2020). However, more disbelief 
was expressed about the results of the Oxford study than that from the 
Imperial Team’s, even though the several limitations pointed out about the 
 
37 While both the Imperial Team study and the Oxford study are non-peer reviewed, 
this shortcoming was projected as an important limitation of the latter, and not to the 
former. 
38 This was the time of the ‘flu’ season as well.  
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Oxford study by critics applied equally to the Imperial study; they could be 
considered as good or as bad as the other.39 Finally,  between the two, it was 
the Imperial Team’s study that became the blueprint for the  strategy to tackle 
Covid-19 not only for the UK and USA but globally as well.  
Covid-19 virus spread across the world primarily by air travel. The 
outbreak in Wuhan city was during the holiday season and with the impending 
Chinese New Year, heavy air traffic was expected to and from China. As early 
as the second week of January 2020, the Journal of Travel Medicine published an 
article highlighting the threat of an international spread of the novel 
coronavirus disease via air travel (Bogoch et al. 2020). Using the 2018 travel 
data from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to quantify 
passenger volumes originating directly and indirectly from Wuhan, and 
Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index scores for countries receiving significant 
numbers of travelers from Wuhan, the authors concluded that ‘major Asian 
hubs are the most probable sites of exportation, should this epidemic 
continue’, but warned that the situation in the ‘northern hemisphere’ may be 
complicated by high levels of ‘influenza-like illnesses at this time of the year’ 
(p.2).40 In the US, estimates of inflow ranged from ‘at least’ 430,000 people 
arriving by direct flights from China before the travel advisory was issued 
(Eder et al.2020) to 759,493 arriving during the critical period in December, 
January and February (Thomas et al. 2020).41 A news item on 24 January 2020, 
pointed out that Italy was a preferred destination for Chinese tourists with the 
Lombardy, Lazio, Tuscany and Veneto as favoured regions; in 2019, Chinese 
visitors had spent over 650 million euros, which was almost  40 percent higher 
than the previous year indicating burgeoning tourism (Xinhua, 2020). All this 
could only mean that, probably, by mid-January 2020, long before a ‘case’ was 
confirmed, the virus was in circulation in several countries including those in 
the Global North, without the infected persons being diagnosed as a ‘case’. 
Yet, even as late as 27 February, the WHO and UNWTO (2020) issued a joint 
statement soft pedaling on the role of tourism and cautioning against 
interfering with international travel which would have a ‘negative repercussions 
on the tourism sector’. The Imperial Team too had acknowledged the 
possibility of community transmission in its modeling when it noted that:  
Infection was assumed to be seeded in each country [UK and US] at an 
exponentially growing rate (with a doubling time of 5 days) from early January 2020, 
with the rate of seeding being calibrated to give local epidemics which 
reproduced the observed cumulative number of deaths in GB or the US seen by 
14th  March 2020. (emphasis added) (Ferguson et al., 2020:4) 
 
 
39 See Ye (2020) for an analysis of the Oxford study.  
40 The IDVI score estimates a country’s capacity to prepare for and manage infectious 
disease threats (Bogoch, 2020). 
41 Sen (2020) reports that China curtailed domestic flights but assured the world all 
was well and opposed travel ban or advisory by other countries.  
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7 Epidemics as bio-political testing grounds 
The Imperial Team, terming their proposed social interventions as ‘non-
pharmaceutical’ interventions (NPI), recommended two ‘fundamental 
strategies’, mitigation or suppression, as control measures. However, in the 
next breath as it were, they made it clear that there was really no choice 
because,  ‘[f]or countries able to achieve it … suppression [is] the preferred 
policy option [because with mitigation, it] would still likely result in hundreds 
of thousands of deaths and health systems (most notably intensive care units) 
being overwhelmed many times over’ (Ferguson et al., 2020:1).42 43 
The Imperial Team then spelt out what ‘suppression’ entailed: ‘it would 
‘minimally require a combination of social distancing of the entire population, 
home isolation of cases and household quarantine of their family members… 
supplemented by school and university closures… until a vaccine becomes 
available (potentially 18 months or more)’ (emphasis added) (Ferguson et al.,  
2020: 1 and 2). When presented with this grim scenario of TINA (there is no 
alternative) few countries could remain unfazed and, whether they were ‘able 
to achieve it or not’, suppression became the strategy of choice;  and in this 
process, some countries, being more loyal than the king, stretched the mandate 
to the maximum. In effect, a complete ‘lockdown’, in the end of March 2020, 
by when the virus had well ‘seeded’ itself across many parts of the world, was  
of questionable value. The Imperial team had admitted to as much when in an 
earlier report dated 21 February, they concluded that ‘more than half of 
COVID-19 cases exported from mainland China have remained undetected 
worldwide, potentially leaving sources of human-to-human transmission 
unchecked’ (Bhatia et al., 2020).  
As country after country went into a ‘lockdown’ incarcerating its 
‘populations’, wherever they were, behind walls that had suddenly sprung, 
invisibly visible, who else to turn to but Foucault.  
It looks like a biopolitical dream: governments, advised by physicians, impose 
pandemic dictatorship on entire populations. Getting rid of all democratic 
obstacles under the pretext of "health," even "survival," they are finally able to 
govern the population as they have, more or less openly, always done in 
modernity: as pure "biomass," as "bare life" to be exploited. (Sarasin, 2020).  
 
 
42 Even as early as 21 March 2020, Italian doctors called for mitigation strategy urging 
community-centered care to replace patient-centered care (Nacoti et al. 2020). 
Moreover, virus and epidemics may cross boundaries but within ‘boundaries’ they end 
up ‘behaving’ differently, epidemiologically speaking, as can be seen from the low 
CFR in Japan compared with Italy, despite similar demographics of an ageing 
population; Italy went for lockdown whereas Japan opted for mitigation.  
43 This is not the first-time numbers have been used to create panic. See Carl Caduff’s 





Referring to the several Foucauldian scholars who, along the lines of the 
above quote, have sought to explain the pandemic as the unfolding of 
authoritarian biopolitics, Sarasin (2020) argues that the concepts of  biopower 
and biopolitics may not be best suited for understanding the global response to 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead, he finds Foucault’s interpretation of the 
public health responses to three diseases – leprosy, plague and smallpox –as 
models for three distinct forms of governance, more appropriate.   
A certain territory was marked out and closed off …The … town…was divided 
up into districts, the districts were divided into quarters, and then the streets 
within these quarters were isolated. In each street there were overseers, in each 
quarter inspectors, in each district someone in charge of the district, … There is, 
then, an analysis of the territory into its smallest elements and across this territory 
the organization of a power that is continuous in two senses. … a power that was 
continuous not only in this pyramidal, hierarchical structure, but also in its 
exercise, since surveillance had to be exercised uninterruptedly…  individuals 
were sorted into those who were ill and those who were not … (Foucault, 2003 
:45-46) 
This ‘spatial partitioning and control (quadrillage)’ during the plague 
epidemics in medieval Europe became the model of political control in the 
eighteenth century, a ‘political dream of an exhaustive, unobstructed power 
that is completely transparent to its object and exercised to the full’ (Foucault 
2003:44,47). This disciplinary form replaced an earlier model based on leprosy 
which segregated and excluded the sick by casting them out, withholding care.  
Smallpox, with the possibility of control through inoculation, gave rise to a 
‘liberal governmentality’ as too much discipline of individuals would have 
undermined their freedom, which was necessary for the system to function 
(Sarasin, 2020:5). Sarasin points out that in the response to Covid-19 all three 
models can be perceived: the complete lockdown follows the plague model; 
the reliance  on voluntary ‘social distancing’, and I would add, searching for the 
holy grail of a vaccine,44 reflects the smallpox model; and abandoning old 
people to die in nursing homes unattended fits the leprosy model.45 I would 
add that the leprosy model was well illustrated in the case of the Diamond 
 
44 By the time a vaccine is available sometime in 2021-22, there may already be 
adequate levels of herd immunity. Moreover, just as in the case of flu vaccines whose 
composition need to be reviewed and updated each year as the virus evolves (CDC, 
2019), the Covid-19 vaccine whenever available will also have to be reviewed and 
updated each year.  
45 Both the US president Donald Trump and Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick were 
reported to have said that old people should sacrifice their lives to save the economy 
(Wexler, 2020).  
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Princess cruise ship 46 and continues to be exhibited in the way the frontline 
health-care workers and other essential services maintenance personnel have 
been expected to function without adequate personal protection (Amnesty 
International 2020).47  
However, while the responses to Covid-19 exemplify the different power 
techniques deployed in the three disease models, they do not tell us the whys 
of it in the current Covid-19 situation.  Why was the ‘plague model’, based as it 
was on the questionable science of the Imperial College recommendation, 
adopted as the dominant model? Why did the global elite find this ‘model’ 
politically expedient despite its potentially devastating impact on the global 
economy, on the circulation of capital?  That the pandemic provides further 
opportunities for capital accumulation (pharmaceuticals including vaccine 
development and manufacture, medical equipment, communication and 
surveillance technologies)48 is only one part of the story because the gains from 
these would be offset by the negative impact on several other sectors, aviation 
and tourism, for instance. That the lockdown provided a justification for the 
exercise of ‘naked power’ (Alon et al. 2020; Youngs and Panchulidze, 2020), is 
also only a part of the story as in any case, globally, surveillance was beginning 
to be normalized in the context of the perceived, growing threat to global 
security.  
Even as a purely public health measure the lockdown should have been 
considered ill-advised because it condemned all other needy populations to 
probable death by withdrawing care. For instance, it has been estimated that 
the negative consequences of  the exclusive focus on Covid-19 could be a rise 
in child and maternal mortality (Fore 2020), an escalation in tuberculosis 
incidence and deaths (Bhargava and Shewade, 2020), increase in the number of 
avoidable cancer deaths  (Maringe et al. 2020),  rising world hunger (FAO et al. 
2020) and has led to a disruption of HIV, STI and Hepatitis services (World 
Health Organization, 2020m) and routine childhood immunization (World 
 
46 On 3 February, the Diamond Princess with 3,711 passengers and crew members on 
board was quarantined immediately after its arrival in Japanese waters because a 
person who had disembarked on 1 January was found to be covid-19 positive. As an 
act of extreme cruelty, the quarantine was like a potential death sentence for the 
passengers and crew because at that time the lethality of the virus was still unknown 
and they were allowed to disembark only at the end of the quarantine period. Among 
the exposed persons, 712 (19.2%) tested positive and 53% were symptomatic; of the 
symptomatics, 9.7% required intensive care and 9 died (Moriarty, 2020). The ‘closed’ 
environment of the ship was perceived as a site of knowledge production, as an ‘ideal 
place to see how coronavirus behaves’ (Mallapaty, 2020).   
47 Racial disparities in deaths due to Covid-19 have also been recorded. In the US, 
deaths among Black people was 3.6 times, indigenous people 3.4 times and Latinos 3.2 
times higher than the white population (APM Research Lab, 2020).   
48 The US government has allocated more than $9 billion (Weintraub and Weise, 
2020) and the EU pledged another $ 8 billion (Stevis-Gridneff and Jakes, 2020) for 
Covid-19 vaccine development. 
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Health Organization, 2020n) among others.49 50 It is remarkable that these not 
unexpected consequences did not form part of the Imperial Team’s estimation 
of deaths due to ‘suppression’ strategy.  
The inequitable impact of the lockdown, particularly on those who live off 
their physical labour and form part of the informal economy, has also been 
pointed out (Cash and Patel, 2020; ILO, 2020). However, this marginalized 
population was in any case increasingly deemed dispensable to the national and 
global economy, and Covid-19 only helped in furthering  the conditions for 
‘letting them die’ in the Foucauldian biopolitical sense. But the lockdown 
strategy brought another ‘population’ under the biopolitical project of ‘letting 
die’– the ‘consuming classes’ –that have hitherto been nurtured and ‘made to 
live’ in order to feed the capitalist economy. The World Bank (2020a:1) reports 
the emergence of a  class of ‘new poor due to Covid-19 pandemic’, defined  as 
‘those who were expected to be non-poor in 2020 prior to the COVID-19 
outbreak but are now expected to be poor in 2020’. Sumner et al. (2020: no 
page) estimate that there will be 400 million ‘new poor’ in developing countries 
with the likelihood of global poverty shifting towards ‘middle income countries 
and South Asia and East Asia’.51 While previously, any move to curtail this 
population’s contribution towards the economy would have well-nigh been 
considered unthinkable, the Covid-19 lockdown forced a drastic change in 
general consumer ‘behaviour’ due to constrained budgets and future 
uncertainties (Arora et al. 2020; Deloitte, undated; Gössling et al. 2020; Sheth, 
2020; Singh, 2020). The World Bank (2020b:3) has assessed the consequences 
of the pandemic strategies and expects that most countries would be plunged 
into recession in 2020 ‘with per capita income contracting … globally since 
1870’. 
Policymakers face formidable challenges as they seek to contain the devastating 
health, macroeconomic, and social effects of the pandemic. During the last global 
recession, in 2009, many EMDEs [Emerging Markets and Developing 
Economies] were able to implement large -scale fiscal and monetary responses. 
Today, however, many EMDEs are less prepared to weather a global downturn 
and must simultaneously grapple with a severe public health crisis with heavy 
human costs. (World Bank, 2020b: 6) 
 
49 In addition, there would be an increased morbidity and mortality among patients 
with long term illnesses such as diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases due to lack of 
care. On the other hand, the lockdown may have had a positive effect on pollution 
related morbidities and mortalities.  
50 When India went into lockdown on 23 March 2020, Jayaprakash Muliyil, one of 
India’s foremost epidemiologists, spoke against a complete lockdown because by then, 
according to him, community transmission was already underway and expected that 
55% of the population would be infected in the first wave (Saikia, 2020).  
51 As one author put it, ‘[t]oday, a pandemic threatens the middle, a disease that hits 
above the belt, unlike cholera and malaria that struck the unwashed and unsheltered. 
Covid-19 doesn't distinguish between classes, but the aftermath will certainly 
distinguish itself by hurting this mass in the middle’ (Singh, 2020). The ‘digital divide’ 
is only one of the many ways the lockdown is acting as a filter between those who will 
live and those who will die among the non-poor (Financial Express, 2020; United 
Nations, 2020; Watts 2020). 
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The ‘heavy human costs’ is not a matter of detail but very much part of 
the need to prune populations to suit the transforming economy. With the 
shrinking role of the consuming classes in buttressing growth and their 
diminished participation in the economy, would it then mean a death knell to 
capitalism? Apparently not. Notwithstanding the metaphorical wringing of 
hands, one does not need to take recourse to conspiracy theories52 to 
understand that global economy is being restructured, violently and 
definitively, with Covid-19 ‘pandemic’ providing an uncontested justification.  
The reason is not far to seek. The virus, coming as it did, at the end of a year 
when there was already evidence that the world economy was heading  for a 
serious recession in 2020 (UNCTAD, 2019), and mobilization across the world 
against climate change was reaching a crescendo, provided an unlooked (?) for  
opportunity to test the waters for an experiment into the next phase of 
capitalism–incorporating ‘degrowth’,  not as an anti-capitalist measure, but to 
transmute it in its own image (Feffer, 2020; Roulet and Bothello, 2020; Stiglitz, 
2019).53  
Following World War-I, when a typhus pandemic in Eastern Europe was 
devastating the Russian troops, Lenin famously remarked ‘[e]ither the lice will 
defeat socialism, or socialism will defeat the lice!’ (italics as in original) (Lenin, 
2012/1919:228). In the context of Covid-19 pandemic however, the virus and 
capitalism have shown a remarkable propensity to nurture and cohabit as 
intimate bedfellows.54  
Foucault (1980 :58) in one of his interviews, remarked ‘[o]ne needs to 
study what kind of body …  society needs’, to understand, ‘what mode of 
investment of the body is necessary and adequate for the functioning of a 
capitalist society like ours’. To answer the question, what kind of ‘body’ do the 
global elite foresee for the future, Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated it 
unequivocally: the future biopolitical project demands an immobile, docile, 
segmented, risk averse (stay safe), individualized, isolated (stay home), ‘socially’ 
distanced (don’t mingle; don’t organize; to care is to kill),  surveilled, biomass 
that will, sooner or later, attrite as they will be ‘let to die’ to suit the new global  
 
52 The Covid-19 pandemic ‘has fuelled more than 2,000 rumors and conspiracy 
theories’ (Rettner 2020). My own favourite is the one that links the Covid-19 
pandemic with 5G mobile telephony technology (See Bruns et al. 2020 for an 
interesting discussion on this conspiracy theory). A recent, more devastating and 
authoritative claim that Covid-19 is a planned pandemic has allegedly been put 
forward by Physicians groups in Germany and Spain (Fetzer 2020).  
53 Some typologies being brought into play are, stakeholder capitalism, inclusive 
capitalism, responsible capitalism, sustainable capitalism, and green capitalism. On the 
need to take into account the interests of stake holders by investment companies, 
Anne Richards, CEO, Fidelity International, remarked ‘[t]oday, we call it sustainable 
capitalism. You might even see it referred to as stakeholder capitalism or ethical 
capitalism or ESG [environmental, social and governance]. But, at some point in the 
near future, it will just be called capitalism’ (Richards, 2020:2). 





biopolitical need for a non-consuming, automated, artificially intelligenced lives 
to mitigate the unprecedented peril faced by our biosphere which threatens the 
existence of the power elite.55 56 The smallpox model of liberal governmentality 
with ‘too much freedom’ cannot serve the system any longer.  
 
55 Wedel (2017) terms them as ‘influence elites’.  
56 Even with the world lockdown, whether the clock has been reset for climate change 
is debatable but this is a narrative that is being promoted aggressively, because within 
a week into lockdown, the media, print and social, was abounding with feel-good 
stories of wildlife ‘moving in’ (see for instance, BBC News, 2020b). However, the 
National Geographic has debunked much of it as fake news put out to give ‘false hope – 
and viral fame’ (Daly, 2020). 
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8 Concluding remarks  
As of 1 December  2020, when this paper was finalized, Covid-19 cases were 
reported from 218 Countries and Territories around the world  with  a total of 
63,729,188   confirmed cases and a death toll of 1,476,909 deaths  amounting 
to a global CFR of 2.3 % (Worldometer, 2020).  Disaggregated rates showed 
wide disparities among countries; for instance, India ranked second highest in 
the world in terms of confirmed cases (9,463,254) whereas its CFR was only 
1.45% (death toll 137,659). In contrast, UK with its relatively low number of 
confirmed cases (1,629,657) and deaths (58,448) had a higher CFR of 3.58%.57 
However, both the WHO (and the media it feeds) have focused on the number 
of ‘cases’ as an indication of the virus ‘lethality’ which has helped deflect 
attention from the fact that,  for the ‘first time in the post-war history of 
epidemics’, there is a reversal with the world’s richest countries having had  to 
face the major brunt of the pandemic (Cash and Patel, 2020:1687) and the 
usual suspects, countries from ‘the third world’, have turned out to be 
surprisingly  relatively ‘immune’. Yet by imposing the ‘suppression’ strategy of 
lockdown on countries in the Global south, what has been ensured is not that 
people may die, but that ‘populations’ will die, and these deaths will not 
necessarily be due to the virus.   
On 7 September, the WHO’s Director General warned: ‘This will not be 
the last pandemic. History teaches us that outbreaks and pandemics are a fact 
of life. But when the next pandemic comes, the world must be ready – more 
ready than it was this time’ (WHO Director-General, 2020c). This warning was 
sounded in 2006 too after the SARS pandemic when  it was  pointed out that 
viruses, especially of the Covid variety ‘possess more risk than other pathogens 
for disease emergence in human and domestic mammals because of their 
higher mutation rates’ (Wang et al. 2006:1839). Barely ten months down the 
line after Covid-19 emerged as a disease of political significance, its origin, 
source and spread, rooted in the process of capital accumulation and the 
ensuing destruction of the global ecosystem that makes zoonoses a recurring 
imminent threat (Chuang.cn, 2020; Fidalgo, 2020), seem to have been all but 
forgotten as the next microbial invasion — Covid-XX – waits in the wings.58   
 
 
57 On 26 September, the CFR in UK was 9.9%.    
58 Pun unintended.  
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suspended in time we wait 
 








home’s our prison 
herd we are 
but herd we can-not  
your breath my death 
covid or cancer 






for shackles to fall 
locked with own hands  
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